NO ERROR IN DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM WHEN PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ALLEGE THAT HE WAS PRESENT WHEN HIS DOG WAS SHOT –WHILE OWNERS MAY FEEL A DEEP ATTACHMENT TOWARDS THEIR DOMESTICATED PETS, THE LAW CONSIDERS THEM TO BE PERSONAL PROPERTY

Buchanan v. Miami-Dade County, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D1980 (Fla. 3rd DCA Oct. 30, 2024):

The issue on appeal was whether a man could seek damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress that he suffered when Miami-Dade County police officers shot and killed his dog.

The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failing to state such a claim, because the plaintiff failed to allege that he was present when his dog was shot.

The plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim because his case concerned unique considerations that apply to cases concerning dead bodies, and thus he did not have to witness the incident to state a claim.

On appeal, the plaintiff did not challenge the general proposition that in order to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on emotional distress, a victim must be present when the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct occurs.

Instead, the plaintiff contended that the fact that he was not present when the dog was shot and killed was not dispositive of his claim, based on the exception to the presence requirement for conduct involving the display of pictures of dead bodies.

The court rejected that argument finding there was no law to support the analogy. Underpinning its conclusion was the well-established principle that despite the deep attachment owners feel towards their domestic pets, Florida law still views animals as personal property.

To the extent that the plaintiff argued that to state a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a pet owner need not be present when the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct for the pet occurred is also misplaced.

In the case the plaintiff relied on, the Florida Supreme Court held that an action for a willful and malicious killing of a dog did not limit the owner’s damages to the market value of the dog but could include the owner’s mental suffering.

That case did not concern itself, however, with the independent tort of intentional social emotional distress, but rather addressed a claim for the malicious killing of a pet.

In any event, that case could not stand for the proposition that a dog’s death need not be witnessed by its owner to state a claim for intentional infliction because the owner in that case was present.