Legal Topics

Criminal law — Driving under influence — Evidence — Urine test results — Consent — Defendant’s consent to urine test was freely given and tests conducted on sample were lawful where trooper advised defendant, who was driving semi-truck that overturned on highway, that he had observed signs of drug impairment, trooper asked defendant to provide urine sample, and defendant agreed to provide sample without any limiting instructions — Intrusion was not unwarranted where defendant provided only one sample — Motion to suppress is denied

Apr 03rd, 2026 in by admin

Criminal law — Driving under influence — Evidence — Urine test results — Consent — Defendant’s consent to urine test was freely given and tests conducted on sample were lawful where trooper advised defendant, who was driving semi-truck that overturned on highway, that he had observed signs of drug impairment, trooper asked defendant to provide urine sample, and defendant agreed to provide sample without any limiting instructions — Intrusion was not unwarranted where defendant provided only one sample — Motion to suppress is denied

STATE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff, v. DEMETRIUS A. SMITH, Defendant. Circuit Court, 8th Judicial Circuit in and for Alachua County. Case No. 01-2023-CT-000706. Division III. September 22, 2025. Amber Allen, Judge.ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’SMOTION TO SUPPRESS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, filed March 13, 2025, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190. On August 8, 2025, a hearing was held on the motion. Florida Highway Patrol Corporal Jonathan Mathis testified at the hearing. Upon consideration of the motion to suppress, the hearing testimony, the evidence presented at the hearing, the legal argument of the parties, and the record, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, this Court finds and concludes as follows:

Defendant seeks to suppress “all testing, results, testimony, and findings relating to Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office Testing of urine provided by the Defendant pursuant to Florida’s “Implied Consent” statute.”

1. On May 20, 2023, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Florida Highway Patrol (“FHP”) Corporal Jonathan Mathis (“Corporal Mathis”) was dispatched to an overturned semi-truck on northbound Interstate 75. At the hearing, Corporal Mathis testified to the following:

The instant investigation was his first driving under the influence (“DUI”) investigation, but he was accompanied by a supervisor during the process of the investigation. Upon arrival, Corporal Mathis identified Defendant as the driver of the semi-truck. Corporal Mathis observed Defendant showing indicators of impairment, including slurred speech, droopy eyelids, drooling, trouble standing, and leaning on vehicles and guardrails for balance. Defendant was provided with an opportunity to consult with medical providers on scene but declined transportation to a medical facility. Corporal Mathis had Defendant perform multiple Standardized Field Sobriety Exercises, including the Walk and Turn and the One Leg Stand. Corporal Mathis observed that Defendant could not maintain walking heel to toe and could not keep his balance, which he understood to be indicators of intoxication. However, Corporal Mathis testified that he did not think Defendant was under the influence of alcohol because he could not smell alcohol on Defendant’s breath, which he expects from alcohol use. Defendant was arrested and, pursuant to Alachua County Sheriff’s Office policy, transported from the scene to the hospital to be medically cleared before arrival at the Alachua County Jail. While at the hospital, Defendant continued to show signs of intoxication including drooling, slurred speech, and falling asleep.

At the Alachua County Jail, Corporal Mathis placed Defendant in a holding cell, advised Defendant that he had observed signs of drug impairment, and asked if Defendant would consent to providing a urinary sample. Corporal Mathis did not read Defendant the implied consent Statute. Defendant provided a urine sample. Corporal Mathis observed Defendant provide the sample to prevent contamination but did not have his hands physically on Defendant. Corporal Mathis testified that Defendant did not hesitate to provide the sample, did not express that he did not want the sample tested, or provide limiting instructions on how the sample should be tested.

2. The Parties have stipulated the following facts:

Between June 20 and June 30, 2023, Florida Department of Law Enforcement Crime Lab Analyst Ashley Pluer (“Analyst Pluer”) tested a urine sample provided by Defendant. On September 28, 2023, Analyst Pluer’s report on the sample, which indicated that no controlled substances were present in the sample, was disclosed to the Defense. On or about May 15, 2024, the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, at the State’s request, tested the sample a second time for the presence of controlled substances, designer benzodiazepines, and other non-controlled substances. The results of the second test indicated the presence of the designer benzodiazepines bromazolam and alpha-hydroxy bromazolam.

3. It is well settled that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness:

The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable. Thus, we have long approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so. The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of “objective” reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”

Florida. v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (citations omitted). The scope of an officer’s search is objectively reasonable if a reasonable person, under the circumstances — including the purported purpose of the search — would understand the scope of consent based on the interaction between the officer and the suspect. See Cox v. State, 975 So. 2d 1163, 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D688b]; Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (holding that it is objectively reasonable for a law enforcement officer, after validly obtaining consent to search an automobile, to open a closed paper bag on the vehicle’s floor because, among other reasons, the suspect “did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search.”); State v. Gibson, 150 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) [39 Fla. L. Weekly D2416b] (holding that the scope of a cheek swab search was reasonable after defendant signed a broad consent form, did not question or challenge law enforcement’s right to possess and use the swab for investigative purposes, and did not place explicit limitation on the scope of his consent to the analysis). The scope of a consent search is additionally “defined by the scope of actual consent in the same way that the scope of a search based upon a search warrant is defined by the warrant.” United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1988). Consent to a specific search limits the reasonableness of the search to that purpose. Id.

4. In the instant case, Trooper Mathis asked if Defendant would consent to providing a urine sample after advising Defendant that he had observed signs of drug impairment. As such, when Defendant consented, a reasonable person would have understood the scope of his consent to be for a urine sample to be tested for impairing substances. Based on the testimony of Trooper Mathis, Defendant did not hesitate to provide the sample, did not express that he did not want the sample tested, and did not provide limiting instructions on how the sample should be tested. Accordingly, Defendant’s urine was tested for evidence of drug impairment. The police activity did not transcend the actual scope of the consent given. Defendant’s consent was given freely and the tests conducted from the search were objectively reasonable. See Cox v. State, 975 So. 2d 1163, 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D688b] (“A search conducted pursuant to freely and voluntarily given consent is lawful.”); State v. Slaney, 653 So. 2d 422, 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) [20 Fla. L. Weekly D717b] (holding that notwithstanding the implied consent statutes, a person who is arrested for DUI may volunteer or freely consent to give a urine sample for chemical testing).

5. Moreover, because Defendant provided only one sample, there was only one intrusion and, therefore, one search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)(“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”); Bailey v. State, 311 So. 3d 303, 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) [46 Fla. L. Weekly D312b] (“The Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent threats to individual liberty that were prevalent at the founding: intrusions by the government into private property.”); Fosman v. State, 664 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D55a] (“Whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is determined by “balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”); Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)(“Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.”). Defendant’s motion is denied.

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

I. The Motion to Suppress is DENIED.