JONATHAN CLAVIJO MONTOYA, et al., Plaintiff, v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 2024-012668-CA-01. Section CA25. October 30, 2025. Valerie R. Manno Schurr, Judge. Counsel: Frantz Nelson, Levin Litigation, PLLC, Hollywood, for Plaintiff. Trevor R. Potter, Kubicki Draper, Miami, for Defendant.ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONFOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTAS TO THE ISSUE OF COVERAGE ANDDENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTIONFOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE having come before the Court on October 21, 2025 on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Issue of Coverage (filed June 4, 2025), the Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Final Summary Judgment (filed July 9, 2025), the Court having reviewed the file (including but not limited to the Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court also having considered the motions, the arguments presented by counsel, the applicable law, and otherwise being fully advised, finds as follows:SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a) “[t]he Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Rodrigues, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2020). The court must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
Moreover, Rule 1.510(f), in line with its federal counterpart, allows for the granting of summary judgment for a non-movant; the granting of the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or for the Court to consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Plaintiffs brought this suit for homeowner’s insurance benefits arising out of an alleged loss which took place on or about September 28, 2022, at which time the Insured’s property is alleged to have sustained damage to its roofing system as a result of heavy wind and rain associated with Hurricane Ian.
2. The loss was first reported to the Defendant on March 22, 2025, at which time, the Defendant assigned claim number 001-00-476991.
3. It is without dispute that on the reported date of loss, there was a policy of insurance issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs, that was in effect.
4. On March 25, 2024, the Defendant issued a reservation of rights letter on the basis of failure to promptly report the claim.
5. Subsequent thereto, the Defendant had the property inspected by the field adjuster Amanda Goobie on April 1, 2024.
6. The Defendant ultimately denied the claim in writing on May 20, 2024, citing that its ability to evaluate the claim had been prejudiced due to failure to report the loss in a timely manner.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
7. On June 4, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment as to the issue of coverage. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs attached the affidavit of Alfredo Brizuela, P.E., a licensed professional engineer, who opined that ultimately, the wind pressure and wind gusts produced by Hurricane Ian created avenues for moisture to enter the structure through openings in the roofing system of the Plaintiffs’ property.
8. On July 9, 2025, the Defendant filed its Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Coverage, and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. In so doing, the Defendant argues that there is no coverage for the subject claim, as the Plaintiffs’ failure to report the loss in a timely manner prejudiced the Defendant’s ability to property investigate and adjust the claim. With this filing, the Defendant enclosed the affidavit of Ted C. Wieder (its designated corporate representative) and the affidavit of Amanda Goobie (its field adjuster).
9. On August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Submitted with this filing were: Exhibit “A” — the Transcript for the Deposition of Christopher Mroz (the Defendant’s designated corporate representative; Exhibit “B” — the Transcript for the Deposition of Amanda Goobie (the Defendant’s field adjuster); and Exhibit “C” — the aforementioned affidavit of Alfredo Brizuela, P.E.
DEENDANT’S ARGUMENT
The Defendant’s main argument is that the Plaintiffs violated the terms and provisions of the policy of insurance, by failing to give prompt notice of the loss in question. The policy of insurance governing the subject claim states in pertinent part as follows:
SECTION I – CONDITIONS
. . .
B. Duties After Loss
In case of a loss to covered property, we have no duty to provide coverage under this Policy if the failure to comply with the following duties is prejudicial to us. These duties must be performed either by you, an “insured” seeking coverage, or a representative of either:
1. Give prompt notice to us or your insurance agent.
The “purpose of policy provisions requiring prompt notice ‘is to enable the insurer to evaluate its rights and liabilities, to afford it an opportunity to make a timely investigation, and to prevent fraud and imposition upon it.’ ” PDQ Coolidge Formad, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 566 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Laster v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 So. 2d 83, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)).
The Defendant argues that pursuant to Florida law, because the Plaintiffs failed to give prompt notice of the loss, the Defendant is entitled to a presumption of prejudice, and the Plaintiffs bear the burden of producing evidence to show that the Defendant was not in fact prejudiced due to the delayed notice of the loss. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Macias, 475 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1985); 1500 Coral Towers v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 112 So. 3d 541, 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D731b].PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs argue that for there to be a total forfeiture of coverage under a homeowner’s insurance policy for failure to comply with post-loss obligations, the insured’s breach must be material. AMICA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Drummond, 970 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D2907a]. If it is shown that the insured materially breached the policy of insurance, there must still be a determination of whether this prejudiced the insurer.
Plaintiffs contend that the question of whether an insured’s untimely reporting of loss is sufficient to result in the denial of recovery under the policy implicates a two-step analysis. See 1500 Coral Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 112 So. 3d 541, 543-45 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D731b] (applying a two-step analysis to the question); Clena Invs., Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LKXIS 40503, 2012 WL 1004851 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2012) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d) (“[M]ost Florida cases appear to treat the issue in two step fashion.”). The first step in the analysis is to determine whether or not the notice was timely given. See 1500 Coral Towers, 112 So. 3d at 543-44; Waldrep, 400 So. 2d at 785-86; Clena Invs., 2012 U.S. Dist. LKXIS 40503, 2012 WL 1004851 at *4. If the notice was untimely, then prejudice to the insurer is presumed. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Macias, 475 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1985); Soronson v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 96 So. 3d 949, 952-53 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D1777a]. However, the presumption of prejudice to the insurer “may be rebutted by a showing that the insurer has not been prejudiced by the lack of notice.” Macias, 475 So. 2d at 1218.
If the notice was untimely, then the analysis proceeds to the second step. 1500 Coral Towers, 112 So. 3d at 544-45; Waldrep, 400 So. 2d at 786; Clena Invs., 2012 U.S. Dist. LKXIS 40503, 2012 WL 1004851 at *4. In the second step, the insured must overcome the presumption by proving that the insurer was not prejudiced by noncompliance with the condition of timely notice. Macias, 475 So. 2d at 1218; Soronson, 96 So. 3d at 952-53.
Where the presumption of prejudice that follows a finding of unreasonable notice is overcome by competent evidence, a separate issue of fact is ordinarily raised. De La Rosa v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Company, 246 So. 3d 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) [43 Fla. L. Weekly D1116a]; Stark v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co., 95 So. 3d 285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D1446a]; Gonzalez v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 441 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).ANALYSIS
The Policy of insurance does not define the term “prompt”. Under Florida law, “prompt,” “as soon as practicable,” “immediate,” or comparable phrases have been interpreted to mean that notice should be given “with reasonable dispatch and within a reasonable time in view of all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 121 So.2d 175, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960), overruled in part on other grounds, Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collura, 163 So.2d 784, 793-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
See the case of Navarro v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp, 353 So. 3d 1276, 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) [48 Fla. L. Weekly D152b]. In Navarro, the insured filed suit against Citizens for breach of contract, asserting the home in which he was living was damaged by Hurricane Irma on September 10, 2017. Citizens denied the claim because, inter alia, Navarro did not provide notice of the loss until May 5, 2020. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Citizens, upon a determination that the insured’s notice to the insurer was not prompt, raising a presumption of prejudice which Navarro failed to rebut. The appellate court affirmed, noting the insured’s own deposition testimony in which he acknowledged that he noticed leaks throughout his residence the day after Irma struck; he observed roof leaks in his house and attempted to make repairs approximately a month after the hurricane; he made even more roof repairs, including replacing roof tiles, the following year; but waited more than two and a half years to report the claim. Navarro conceded that “his only explanation for failing to report the damages to Citizens was a lack of fluency with the terms of the policy.” Navarro, 353 So. 3d at 1279. The record in the instant case falls woefully short of establishing any such finding.
The Court finds that in the instant case, there is sufficient evidence to establish that the Plaintiffs did not promptly report the loss to the Defendant, thereby raising a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. The Court therefore proceeds to step two of the analysis.
The Court notes that the record evidence reflects that the Defendant’s field adjuster inspected the property and performed a visual assessment. However, there is no indication that Ms. Goobie performed any type of testing at the property or took any form of thermal imaging during the course of the inspection. It should further be noted that while field adjuster Goobie avers that she could not say with any certainty that the reported damages occurred on the reported date of loss, or that the reported damages were the result of a one-time sudden and accidental occurrence (See affidavit of Amanda Goobie, ¶ 6), she also testified in this matter that she was not even tasked with making such determinations in the first place. See transcript for the deposition of Amanda Goobie, Pg. 19, lines 12 – Pg. 20, line 1.
The Court further takes note of the fact that at the time of field adjuster Goobie’s inspection, Defendant was in possession of a mitigation inspection report from June of 2022 (just three months prior to the loss in question). This documentation shows that the Defendant had the roof inspected in both June and August of 2022, at which time the Defendant advised the Plaintiff that the Defendant was dissatisfied with the condition of the roof and that if the roof was not repaired, the policy would be non-renewed. The evidence shows that the Plaintiff had the roof repaired at a cost of $1,500.00 and submitted proof of repairs to the Defendant, at which point, the Defendant chose to continue insuring the roof. None of this documentation was provided to field adjuster Goobie either before or after her inspection. See transcript for the deposition of Amanda Goobie, Pg. 13, line 22 – Pg. 17, line 21.
As its first affirmative defense in this matter, the Defendant alleges that it was prejudiced in its ability to evaluate the claim due to the failure to report the claim promptly. The Defendant has no information or documentation to suggest that there were any repairs to the roof the between the date of loss and the date of field adjuster Goobie’s inspection, nor does the Defendant possess any information to suggest that the condition of the roof substantially changed during that time period. See transcript for the deposition of Christopher Mroz, Pg. 27, line 5 – Pg. 28, line 1. Additionally, the Defendant did not have the roof evaluated by a roofer, general contractor or engineer, nor did the Defendant even attempt to do so. See transcript for the deposition of Christopher Mroz, Pg.28, lines 2 – 6.
Additionally, the evidence shows that Plaintiff has since had the roof evaluated by Mr. Alfredo Brizuela, who is both a licensed general contractor and a professional engineer. Mr. Brizuela has attested within a reasonable degree of professional and engineering certainty that the damage to the roofing system, and corresponding ensuing interior water damage, were the result of wind associated with Hurricane Ian. This also raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendant would in fact have been able to determine the cause and origin of the damages in question, had the Defendant retained a duly qualified expert to examine the roofing system at the time of its initial investigation and adjustment.
Based upon all of the foregoing, the Court believes that there is sufficient record evidence for a finder of fact to conclude that the Plaintiffs have rebutted the presumption of prejudice in favor of the Defendant and as such, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the issue of failure to give prompt notice must be denied as a matter of law. Conversely, it stands to reason that if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendant was unduly prejudiced by the Plaintiffs’ failure to timely report the loss, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment must also be denied for the same reasons.CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Coverage is hereby DENIED and the Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Final Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.