Simon v. Coyote Logistics, LLC, 50 Fla L. Weekly D2269 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 22, 2025):

The estate of a man killed in a fiery tractor–trailer crash sued multiple parties, including Coyote Logistics, a licensed freight broker that arranged transport of a beer load.

The estate alleged that Coyote negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier and, in a separate count, that Coyote actually acted as and had the right to control the motor carrier, making it vicariously liable. The trial court granted summary judgment for Coyote, holding the claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) and that the statute’s safety exception did not apply to brokers.

On appeal, the Second District agreed that negligent selection and vicarious liability claims against a broker fall within the FAAAA’s broad preemption clause because they relate to a broker’s prices, routes, or services in arranging transportation.

However, the safety exception preserves the “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” Looking to decisions from other jurisdictions, the court held Florida’s common-law negligence framework for broker selection and control is part of the state’s traditional motor vehicle safety authority and is expressly carved out from preemption when a motor vehicle crash is involved.

The Second District rejected the notion that the safety exception can never apply to brokers simply because they are not named in the exception, however. Instead, the question is whether the particular state-law claim is an exercise of safety authority “with respect to motor vehicles.”

Here, the estate’s negligence and vicarious liability counts arose directly from a tractor–trailer crash allegedly caused by glaring safety defects (slow-moving truck on an interstate, inoperative lights, missing conspicuity tape). Those allegations were enough to bring the claims within the safety exception’s scope.

Because the trial court resolved the case solely on preemption and did not reach the merits, and because factual questions remained about Coyote’s role (broker versus de facto carrier and its level of control), the Second District reversed the summary judgment in Coyote’s favor and remanded for further proceedings on the estate’s claims.