YESICA ELIZABETH MERINO RIVAS, Petitioner/Mother, v. DIEGO EDGARDO AVALOS SANCHEZ, Respondent/Father. Circuit Court, 2nd Judicial Circuit in and for Gadsden County. Case No. 24-000860-DRA. Family Division. April 15, 2025. David M. Frank, Judge. Counsel: Erika Britt Nyborg-Burch, Public Interest Law Center, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee, for Plaintiff. Diego Edgardo Avalos Sanchez, Pro se, Respondent/Father.
FINAL JUDGMENT OF PATERNITY, PARENTALRESPONSIBILITY, AND BEST INTEREST ORDER
This case came before this Court for a hearing on a Verified Petition to Determine Paternity and for Related Relief, under Chapter 742, Florida Statutes. The Court, having reviewed the file and heard the testimony, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
SECTION I. JURISDICTION:
1. This Court is authorized and has jurisdiction to determine paternity and parental responsibility and to establish a parenting plan regarding the Minor Child identified in paragraph five, below. Chapter 742, Florida Statutes grants this Court jurisdiction to make such findings upon the petition of “[a]ny woman who is pregnant or has a child, any man who has reason to believe that he is the father of a child, or any child . . . when paternity has not been established by law or otherwise.” § 742.011, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to that same provision, a parent may also “request a determination of parental responsibility” as well as “the creation of a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule pursuant to chapter 61.” Id. Petitioner has filed a Petition asking this Court to make such findings. See In re. Amended Petition, Merino Rivas v. Avalos Sanchez, No. 24-000860-DRA (Fla. Cir. Ct., 2nd Jud. Cir., Gadsden County) [hereinafter In re Petition].
2. In entering an order regarding respective parental responsibility, time-sharing or visitation, and a parenting plan, the Court determines the custody arrangement that furthers the best interest of minor children based on the evidence before it. See §61.046(14)(c), Fla. Stat. (“. . . a judgment or order incorporating a parenting plan under this part is a child custody determination. . .”). See also id. §61.046(18) (defining “sole parental responsibility” as “a court-ordered relationship in which one parent makes the decisions regarding the minor child” where Florida no longer uses the term “sole custody”). Once the Court has entered such an order, the Court retains jurisdiction to enter further orders as circumstances of the parties may in justice and equity require. See id. §742.06.
3. As a state court that adjudicates paternity, parental responsibility, and parenting plans, this Court has jurisdiction to make findings of parental abandonment under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes. See § 61.13(2)(c)(2)(C), Fla. Stat. (requiring court to order sole parental responsibility when in the best interests of the minor child, including where one parent’s “abandonment” renders shared parental responsibility detrimental to the child); see also id. § 39.01(1) (defining abandonment under Florida law).
4. The purpose of this Order is to define the relationship between Petitioner, Respondent, and the Minor Child, such that the Petitioner is awarded sole parental responsibility for the Minor Child, and the best interests of the Minor Child are protected.
5. The minor child at issue in this matter is:
Name: C.A.A.M. [Editor’s note: Child’s name in Initial Caps]
Date of Birth: [Editor’s note: Date of birth redacted]
Current Address: [Editor’s note: Address redacted] Quincy, Florida 32351
6. Respondent Diego Edgardo Avalos Sanchez conceded that this Court has jurisdiction over the instant Petition. See Acceptance and Waiver of Service of Process of and Answer to In re. Petition, Merino Rivas v. Avalos Sanchez, No. 24-000860-DRA (Fla. Cir. Ct., 2nd Jud. Cir., Gadsden County) [hereinafter Avalos Answer].
SECTION II. FINDINGS
7. Petitioner and Respondent had a relationship as partners for approximately five years, from 2006 until 2011. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 4-5. During that time, they conceived the Minor Child, who was born on October 14, 2010, in San Salvador, El Salvador. Id. ¶ 2; In re Petition ¶ 15; Avalos’s Answer ¶ 3. While Petitioner and Respondent were not married, they are both identified as the Minor Child’s parents on her birth certificate. The Minor Child’s birth certificate is admitted to the record as Exhibit A.
8. When the Minor Child was first born, Petitioner and Respondent lived together in Respondent’s mother’s home. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 5. During that time, the Respondent committed acts of abuse against the Petitioner. Id. Because of that abuse, Petitioner and the Minor Child moved to the home where Petitioner was raised with her maternal grandmother and grandfather, about five minutes by foot from where Respondent lived. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. Beginning around 2011, Petitioner raised the Minor Child in this home with the Minor Child’s great grandparents and maternal aunts and uncle. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 7.In re Petition ¶ 17. See Avalos Answer ¶ 3 (admitting facts in Petition as to Respondent’s conduct).
9. Ever since the Petitioner and the Minor Child moved in with Petitioner’s grandparents around 2011, Petitioner and her family have been the sole financial supporters of the Minor Child. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 10. Respondent has been employed at a supermarket during this time, but he has not contributed any of his income to the Minor Child’s care. Id.; In re Petition ¶ 18; Avalos Answer ¶ 3.
10. When Petitioner and Respondent first separated, Respondent would visit Petitioner and the Minor Child one or two times each month. In re Petition ¶ 17. Each visit lasted for a few minutes. Id.; Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 8. Petitioner believes that Respondent’s visits were a tactic to manipulate her into dating him again. Id. ¶ 9. Petitioner recalls being upset by the Respondent’s lack of care for the Minor Child, including when Respondent kicked the Minor Child with his foot while she was learning to crawl. Id. ¶ 8. In public, Respondent also denied that the Minor Child was his daughter. Id. He has since admitted in these proceedings that he is the biological father of the Minor Child. See Avalos Answer ¶ 3.
11. As time passed, Respondent visited Petitioner and the Minor Child less and less frequently. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 9. By 2015, Respondent had stopped coming to visit the Minor Child at the house where she lived with her mother, her great-grandparents, and her aunt and uncle. Id.; In re Petition ¶ 17. He also did not try to contact the Minor Child through Petitioner, and even blocked Petitioner’s phone number when he found out that Petitioner was dating someone else years after she separated from Respondent. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 9, 11.
12. Around 2016, Petitioner and the Minor Child fled El Salvador for the United States. Id. ¶ 12. There, Petitioner met her current husband, who is Minor Child’s stepfather. Id. ¶ 13. In 2019, the family moved to Quincy, Florida, to be closer to Petitioner’s husband’s family. Id. Petitioner and her husband were married in 2021. Id.
13. In Quincy, the Minor Child lives with her mother, her stepfather, and her younger sister, near her grandmother, her aunts, her step-grandmother, and her step-aunts. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 13, 22. The Minor Child considers her stepfather to be her father, and she has no memories or contact with Respondent, her biological father. Id. ¶ 14.
14. Since moving to Quincy, Petitioner enrolled the Minor Child in James Shanks Middle School. Id. ¶ 16; In re Petition ¶ 22. There, the Minor Child is excelling in her studies and pursuing her current dreams of becoming an engineer. Id. Petitioner provides a safe home environment and attends to the Minor Child’s needs so the Minor Child can focus on her studies and channel her passions for science and art. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19. At home, Petitioner and her husband support the Minor Child’s other dream of becoming a chef and foster opportunities for her to engage with her art projects. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 16, 17; In re Petition ¶ 22.
15. Petitioner has also invested in the Minor Child’s spiritual growth. Petitioner and her family attend St. Thomas the Apostle in Quincy, Florida, where the Minor Child is studying catechism. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 17. Petitioner has observed how the Minor Child’s faith has helped her through challenges. Id.
16. When Minor Child went through one such challenging period, Petitioner identified her daughter’s struggles and sought help. In re Petition ¶ 23; Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 18. Since the Minor Child was diagnosed with adolescent depression, Petitioner has arranged for therapy and psychiatry appointments. Id. She also plans activities to bring distractions and joy to the Minor Child in accordance with the therapist’s recommendations. Id. Petitioner reports that the Minor Child’s treatment team is hopeful for the Minor Child’s prognosis. Id. She also reports the Minor Child to be as a caring and sensitive teen and attentive big sister, who is looking forward to the arrival of a baby sister soon. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 15, 17, 18.
17. Petitioner credibly expressed reasonable concerns about what would happen to the Minor Child in a medical emergency or a difficult situation at school. Id. ¶ 20. Given Respondent’s abandonment, she worries that the Minor Child is at risk of harm should a hospital or educational institution demand both parents’ consent. Id. Respondent does not communicate with Petitioner, and even if he responded to her communication, Respondent’s abandonment makes him ill-suited to make decisions in the best interests of the Minor Child. Id. The Minor Child is too young to remember any role Respondent played in the first year of her life and she considers her mother and stepfather to be her parents and caretakers. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. Petitioner also worries that the Minor Child will miss out on opportunities at school or in her extracurriculars because of a presumed shared responsibility between Petitioner and the Minor Child’s biological father, who has not fulfilled his parental obligations for over a decade. Id. ¶ 21.
18. Petitioner’s maternal grandfather who raised her in El Salvador passed away about a year ago. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 22. Her only family remaining in El Salvador is her grandmother, the Minor Child’s great-grandmother. Id.
19. Petitioner also submitted record evidence regarding the risk of gender-based violence and discrimination that her daughter could face as a young woman in El Salvador. That evidence is admitted to the record as Exhibit B.
SECTION III. PATERNITY
20. The Court finds that Petitioner Yesica Elizabeth Merino Rivas is the natural and biological mother of the Minor Child.
21. The Court finds that Respondent Diego Edgardo Avalos Sanchez is the natural and biological father of the Minor Child, based on the Minor Child’s birth certificate, Petitioner’s testimony, and Respondent’s admissions. Respondent signed a Waiver of Service of Process and an Answer wherein he concedes this Court’s jurisdiction over the Petition, and admits the allegations set forth therein with respect to his paternity and his acts and omissions towards the Minor Child. See Avalos Answer ¶ 3.
SECTION IV. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARENTING PLAN
22. No Court in the United States or El Salvador has granted legal custody of the Minor Child to an adult or relative, including since her arrival in the United States. No adult or relative, apart from the Petitioner, has initiated proceedings to obtain legal custody of the Minor Child, including since her arrival to the United States.
23. Having no prior, legally compelled parental agreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent for parental responsibility of the Minor Child, it is in the Minor Child’s best interests that this Court award sole parental responsibility to the Petitioner. While public policy generally favors shared parental responsibility, Florida law requires the Court to “order sole parental responsibility for a minor child to one parent, with or without time-sharing with the other parent if it is in the best interests of the minor child.” § 61.13 (2)(c)(5), Fla. Stat. In determining whether shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child and whether the child’s best interest instead favor sole custody for one parent, the court considers whether the minor child is a victim of parental abuse, abandonment, or neglect, as those terms are defined in Chapter 39, along with any factors that bear on the detriment of shared parental responsibility. Id. § 61.13 (2)(c)(2)(C), (D).
24. This Court finds that Respondent abandoned the Minor Child when the Minor Child was a toddler. Section 39.01(1), defines abandonment as “a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child . . . while being able, has [1] made no significant contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or [2] has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both.” § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Failure to “establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship” includes failure to maintain “frequent and regular contact with the child through frequent and regular visitation or frequent and regular communication to or with the child, and the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities.” Id. While the forms of abandonment are disjunctive, and proof of only one is required, the Court finds the Respondent has abandoned the Minor Child under either prong.
25. In support of this conclusion as to Respondent’s abandonment, this Court finds that Respondent has not made contributions to the Minor Child’s care and maintenance since the Petitioner moved out of the Respondent’s mother’s home to escape Respondent’s mistreatment when the Minor Child was about a year old. In re. Petition ¶ 17; Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 6, 10. While the Respondent sporadically visited Petitioner’s home for a few minutes each month over the course of a few years, he did not help Petitioner to care for and maintain the Minor Child. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 8, 10. At that time, Respondent was employed at a supermarket, and so had the financial means to contribute in some way to the Minor Child’s care. In re. Petition ¶ 18; Avalos Answer ¶ 3; Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 10. In the absence of paternal support, Petitioner and her family have ensured that the Minor Child grows up in a safe and supportive environment where her mother and her mother’s family attend to her needs with care. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 7, 14, 16-19. Because the Respondent has failed to provide for the Minor Child’s basic needs in any sustaining, meaningful way, he has abandoned the Minor Child. See F.L.C. v. G.C., 24 So. 3d 669, 670-71 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) [34 Fla. L. Weekly D2593a] (“[T]he trial court’s determination that the father had abandoned the children was amply supported by the record. The evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the father 1) had no meaningful relationship with the children, 2) had made less than marginal efforts to communicate with his sons, and 3) had failed to provide adequate support.”); see also in re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) [40 Fla. L. Weekly D849a] (holding that conduct that occurred outside of the United States satisfied the statutory elements for abandonment under Chapter 39).
26. Respondent also has not maintained any relationship with the Minor Child at least since around 2015. After Petitioner moved with her one-year-old daughter to escape domestic violence, Respondent made minimal efforts to have contact with the Minor Child. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 6-8. Even when he was physically present with the Minor Child, he did not maintain a positive relationship with the Minor Child. Id. ¶ 8. He also denied the Minor Child was his daughter, despite recognition of paternity on her birth certificate and his admission of paternity in these proceedings. Id.; In re. Petition, Ex. A; Avalos Answer ¶ 3. When the Minor Child was around four or five years old, Respondent ceased having any contact — and thus any relationship — with her. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 9. That Respondent had the means to maintain a relationship with the Minor Child is evidenced by Petitioner’s continued residence at her grandmother’s house in El Salvador for many months after Respondent last visited the Minor Child, Petitioner’s maintenance of her Salvadoran phone number in the United States on WhatsApp, and Respondent’s mother and his aunt’s continued ability to contact the Minor Child over Facebook. Id. ¶ 11.
27. Respondent’s decision not to exercise his parental rights and responsibilities also supports a finding of abandonment. Respondent has not contributed to the Minor Child’s daily care, shelter, food, clothing, or educational programming since around 2011. In re. Petition ¶¶ 17-18; Avalos Answer ¶ 3; Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 7, 9-10. As of March 2025, Respondent resides in San Salvador, El Salvador. See Avalos Answer, pg. 2.
28. Because the Respondent abandoned the Minor Child, this Court awards Petitioner, Yesica Elizabeth Merino Rivas, sole parental responsibility of the Child until the Minor Child reaches the age of majority, subject to this Court’s continued jurisdiction. See §742.06, Fla. Stat.
29. Because Respondent abandoned the Minor Child, it is also in the best interests of the Minor Child that the Court order the family to comply with a Parenting Plan that does not include sharing of parental responsibility between Petitioner and Respondent. This Court has the broad authority to act in furtherance of the best interests of the child in determining respective custody over the child. Some of the factors the Court may consider when making this best interest determination regarding care of a minor child include “[t]he demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to determine, consider, and act upon the needs of the child as opposed to the needs or desires of the parent,” “[t]he demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to participate and be involved in the child’s school and extracurricular activities,” [t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity,” the “anticipated division of parental responsibilities,” and “developmental stages and needs of the child and the demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to meet the child’s developmental needs,” “[t]he particular parenting tasks customarily performed by each parent,” and evidence of “domestic violence” or “child abandonment” by one parent, §§ 61.13(3)(b), (c), (d), (m), (p), (s), Fla. Stat.
30. The Minor Child currently lives with and is cared for by the Petitioner and the Minor Child’s stepfather. In re. Petition ¶ 16; Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 13, 14, 22. Petitioner and her husband provide the Minor Child with a safe, stable home in Quincy, where the Minor Child has grown into a creative, hardworking, and caring teenager. In re. Petition ¶¶ 16, 21; Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 14-19. Petitioner enrolled the Minor Child in James Shanks Middle School in Quincy, and the Minor Child is excelling at her studies. In re. Petition ¶ 22; id. Ex. B (recognition received from Gov. DeSantis and former Vice President Harris); Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 16. Petitioner has also built a community for the Minor Child at her church, St. Thomas the Apostle, where the Minor Child is studying catechism. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 17. When the Minor Child began to experience depression, Petitioner took care to find a therapist and psychiatrist for the Minor Child and has involved the whole family in supporting her daughter through her diagnosis and treatment. Id. ¶ 18; In re. Petition ¶ 23. In Quincy, the Minor Child is surrounded by family — in addition to her mother and stepfather, she lives with her younger sister and has aunts and grandparents who are also invested in her wellbeing. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 13, 14, 22.
31. In addition to these positive factors, additional adverse factors weigh against sharing custody with Respondent. Respondent abandoned the minor child about a decade ago, and before that time, he exposed Minor Child to violence against her mother. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶¶ 5-6. Petitioner worries that her daughter could be exposed to further societal violence and discrimination should she live with Respondent in El Salvador. Pet’r’s Aff. ¶ 24; Ex. B. Therefore, it is the best interest of the Minor Child that the Court does not award time-sharing with Respondent nor establish a visitation schedule.
32. The parties shall comply with the Parenting Plan which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit C.
33. The Petitioner is authorized to make all reasonable and necessary decisions for the Minor Child, including but not limited to:
a) Consenting to all necessary and reasonable medical and dental care for the Minor Child, including nonemergency surgery and psychiatric care;
b) Securing copies of the child’s records, held by third parties, that are necessary for the care of the child, including, but not limited to:
i. Medical, dental, and psychiatric records;
ii. Educational records;
iii. Birth certificates and other vital records.
c) Educational services for the Minor Child, including enrolling the Minor Child in school and granting or withholding consent for Minor Child to be tested or placed in special school programs, including exceptional education, and to participate in extracurricular activities; and
d) Taking all other actions necessary for the care and protection of the Child.
34. This award of sole parental responsibility to Petitioner without time-sharing with Respondent will ensure that Petitioner is not impeded in caring for and protecting the Minor Child by Respondent’s abandonment of the Minor Child.
SECTION V. REUNIFICATION WITH RESPONDENT IS NOT A VIABLE OPTION
35. The Minor Child cannot be reunified with Respondent because Respondent abandoned the Minor Child when the Minor Child was a baby, and he has not made any attempt to care for the Minor Child in the ensuing decade. See § 39.01 (1), Fla. Stat. (defining parental abandonment under Florida law). Abandonment occurs when a parent fails to contribute to the child’s care and maintenance despite having the means to do so or fails to maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, including by failing to have frequent and regular contact or visitation. See id.; see also Section IV, supra ¶ 24 (discussing disjunctive elements of abandonment under Florida law). Respondent had the financial means to care for the Minor Child, yet he has not contributed financially to the Minor Child’s care since Petitioner moved out of the Respondent’s mother’s home in 2011. See Sections II & IV supra ¶¶ 8-9, 25, 27. Respondent also failed to provide nonfinancial forms of care and failed to maintain a positive relationship with the Minor Child, including by denying that the Minor Child was his daughter, withholding love and attention for the short periods that he came to visit Petitioner, and ceasing to visit the Minor Child at all when she was around four or five years old. See id., supra, ¶¶ 10-11, 25-27. Petitioner ensured that Respondent could physically locate the Minor Child and that Respondent could contact the Minor Child, including after Petitioner and the Minor Child left El Salvador, but the Respondent did not make any efforts to communicate with the Minor Child. See id., supra, ¶¶ 11, 26. Now, a decade after these acts of abandonment, the Minor Child has no memories her biological father and considers her stepfather as her sole paternal figure. See id., supra, ¶¶ 13, 17, The Court thus finds that Respondent’s abandonment of the Minor Child prevents the Minor Child from being reunified with her biological father, Respondent.
36. The Court’s finding that the Minor Child’s reunification with her biological father is not a viable option due to abandonment, as defined in Chapter 39, is final until the Child reaches the age of majority and/or until further order from this Court, if any.
SECTION VI. TIME-SHARING WITH MINOR CHILD
37. Respondent shall have no time-sharing with the Minor Child. As set forth in Paragraphs 28 & 29, supra, this finding is supported by the Court’s determination that Respondent abandoned the Minor Child. It is further supported by Respondent’s waiver of participation in these proceedings.
SECTION VII. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD TO REMAIN WITH PETITIONER AND NOT RETURN TO EL SALVADOR
38. It is in the Minor Child’s best interest that the Petitioner be granted sole parental responsibility of the Minor Child until the Minor Child reaches the age of majority.
39. It is in the Minor Child’s best interest to remain with her mother, Petitioner, in the United States. The Minor Child currently lives with and is cared for by Petitioner and the Minor Child’s stepfather at her home in Gadsden County, Florida. See Section II, supra ¶ 13. Petitioner ensures that the Minor Child receives health care, including mental health care, and that she grows up surrounded by supportive family members. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. Petitioner supports the Minor Child financially without assistance from Respondent, the Minor Child’s biological father. Id. ¶ 9. Petitioner also ensures that the Minor Child’s educational, emotional, and spiritual needs are met in her current environment. Id. ¶ 14-16. It is thus in the best interest of the Minor Child that Petitioner be awarded sole parental responsibility of the Minor Child without any parental responsibility or time-sharing for the Minor Child’s biological father in El Salvador.
40. It would not be in the Minor Child’s best interest to return to El Salvador, the country of Respondent’s nationality, because Respondent has completely abandoned the Minor Child. See Section IV, supra ¶ 24-28. Respondent has not lived with or cared for the Minor Child since 2011 and has not maintained any relationship with the Minor Child for about a decade. See Sections II & IV, supra ¶¶ 10-12, 25-26. The Minor Child has no relationship with Respondent and considers her stepfather as her father. See Section IV, supra ¶ 17. Should the Minor Child return to El Salvador, Respondent’s abandonment would leave the Minor Child without a parent to shelter and care for her.
41. Additionally, a custodial placement in El Salvador would not be in the best interest of the Minor Child, as there is no suitable placement for the Minor Child in El Salvador. The Minor Child’s maternal aunts and grandmother are in the United States. See Section II, supra ¶ 13. The only family member with whom the Minor Child maintains a relationship who remains in El Salvador is the Minor Child’s maternal great-grandmother, who recently lost her husband, the Minor Child’s great-grandfather. Id. ¶ 18. The Minor Child’s great-grandmother does not have the physical strength to care for the Minor Child at her advanced age. Without family to care for her, the Minor Child is vulnerable to violence, including gender-based violence, in El Salvador. Id. ¶¶ 19. This risk, coupled with the absence of any suitable caretaker in El Salvador further supports the Court’s conclusion that it is not in the best interest of the Minor Child to return to El Salvador.
42. This Court makes the following findings pursuant to this Court’s authority to make findings as to the care, custody, and best interest of the child. See §§ 61.13(2)(c), 744.371, Fla. Stat. It is not in the Minor Child’s best interest to return to her country of nationality, El Salvador, because in El Salvador the Minor Child was abandoned by her biological father, the Respondent. See § 39.01 (1), Fla. Stat. (defining parental abandonment under Florida law). The Minor Child also does not have another caretaker to raise her and protect her from the risk of violence she faces there without an adult caregiver. The Minor Child’s best interest is to remain in the United States with her mother, Petitioner, where Petitioner can continue to care for all of the Minor Child’s emotional, physical, and economic needs, with the help of Petitioner’s family.
SECTION VIII. CHILD SUPPORT
43. The Petitioner did not request the establishment of child support.
SECTION IX. METHOD OF PAYMENT
44. A method for and timing of payments is not ordered as child support has not been requested.
SECTION X. ATTORNEY’S FEES, COSTS, AND SUIT MONEY
45. The Petitioner did not request attorney’s fees, cost, or suit money. Counsel for the Petitioner has likewise not requested fees, costs, or suit money.
SECTION XI. OTHER PROVISIONS
46. The Court reserves jurisdiction to enforce this Order for Custody until the Minor Child reaches the age of majority, and to enter orders for the welfare of the Child. See §742.06, Fla. Stat. This Order may only be modified by petition of the parties, and upon the consent of this Court.