Consumer law — Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act — Motor vehicle dealers — Sale of vehicle — Dealer committed per se violations of section 320.27(9)(b)3 and FDUTPA where dealer represented that vehicle purchased by plaintiff was Audi S3 despite having performed no diagnostic testing or inspections to substantiate that claim, and plaintiff later learned that vehicle was not equipped with S3 engine — Dealer violated section 501.976(18) and committed per se violation of FDUTPA by charging plaintiff a document processing fee that was a pre-delivery service fee without including statutorily-required disclosures — Undisputed record showing that dealer sold vehicle in violation of mandatory duties with respect to emissions equipment, misrepresented condition of vehicle, and falsely certified compliance with emission laws established per se violation of FDUTPA — Summary judgment on count alleging breach of express warranty is precluded by genuine issues of material fact concerning whether any express warranty was made regarding vehicle’s configuration, whether representations extended beyond mere sales talk, and scope and enforceability of any warranty — Summary judgment on count alleging violation of Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act is precluded by disputes of material fact on whether dealer knew at time of communication that asserted right to collect pre-delivery service fee was nonexistent — Damages — Plaintiff is entitled to damages reflecting diminution in value of vehicle and amount of pre-delivery service fee — Injunctions — Where plaintiff is an aggrieved consumer and dealer’s violations demonstrate pattern of unfair and deceptive conduct, plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunctive relief enjoining dealer from those violations — Plaintiff is entitled to award of attorney’s fees and costs

RYAN PERSAUD, Plaintiff, v. GULF COAST AUTO BROKERS, INC., a Florida corporation, and GROW FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION, A Federal credit union, Defendants. Circuit Court, 12th Judicial Circuit in and for Sarasota County, Civil Division. Case No. 2023-CA-006884-NC. October 13, 2025. Hunter W. Carroll, Judge. Counsel: Joshua Feygin, Sue Your Dealer — A Law Firm, Hollywood, for Plaintiff. Hamdee Saif Khader, Tampa, for Gulf Coast Auto Brokers, Inc., Defendant. Sammy Hatem Hamed, Tampa, for Grow Financial Credit Union, Defendant.ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTIONFOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came before the Court on September 25, 2025, via remote videoconference, on Plaintiff, Ryan Persaud’s (“Plaintiff”) Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DIN 243) (“Motion”), Defendant, Gulf Coast Auto Broker’s (“Defendant” or “Dealer”) Response (DIN 255) (“Response”) and Plaintiff’s Reply (DIN 262) (“Reply”). Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Joshua Feygin, Esq.; Defendant Gulf Coast Auto Brokers, Inc., was represented by counsel, Hamdee Khader, Esq.; and Defendant Grow Financial Credit Union appeared through counsel, Rob Keller, Esq. The Court, having considered the Motion, Response, Reply, Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (DIN 242), Plaintiff’s Expert Report (DIN 119) the record evidence including the deposition transcript of the Defendant’s Corporate Representative, Samer Khader (DIN 157), and applicable law, heard argument, and being otherwise fully advised, finds and concludes as follows:FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On or about March 9th, 2023, the Plaintiff entered into a written contract Retail Purchase Agreement with Dealer for the purchase of a motor vehicle that was advertised as a 2016 Audi S3 VIN ending in 72541 (“Vehicle”) for the purchase price of $23,955.00, exclusive of sales tax, and incidental charges.

2. A true and correct copy of the Retail Purchase Agreement (“RPA”) is attached to the Plaintiff’s Motion and incorporated therein by reference as Exhibit “A.”

3. At the time of the sale of the Vehicle, the Defendant was a Florida profit corporation licensed as a motor vehicle dealership under Florida law.

4. To finance the purchase of the Vehicle, Dealer prepared and Plaintiff executed a Retail Installment Sale Contract (“RISC”) with the Dealer to finance the resulting balance.

5. A true and correct copy of the RISC is attached to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and incorporated therein by reference as Exhibit “C.”

6. As reflected in the RISC and RPA, Plaintiff paid a $3,000 downpayment.

7. As reflected in the RISC, Dealership charged a $799.00 “Document Processing Fee.”

8. Plaintiff paid the $799.00 “Document Processing Fee” to Defendant.

9. The $799.00 Document Processing Fee was not associated with the statutory disclosure required by Fla. Stat. 501.976(18).

10. During the sales process, Dealer prepared and presented to Plaintiff a Vehicle Air Pollution Control Statement for execution.

11. A true and correct copy of the Air Pollution Control Statement is attached to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and incorporated therein by reference as Exhibit “D.”

12. Shortly after purchasing the Vehicle, Plaintiff experienced unexpected mechanical issues.

13. Plaintiff delivered the Vehicle for diagnostic evaluation to Christian Brothers Automotive (“CBA”) on or about March 21, 2023.

14. A true and correct copy of Repair Order No. 52558 from CBA is attached to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as Composite Exhibit “E.”

15. CBA visually inspected the Vehicle and determined it was missing a catalytic converter.

16. Defendant does not know whether it inspected the Vehicle before selling it to the Plaintiff.

17. Defendant has no written policies or procedures for inspecting vehicles before their sale to consumers, nor does Defendant maintain records of inspections.

18. Defendant is unaware of where the catalytic converter for the Vehicle is located.

19. Defendant did not inspect the Vehicle’s engine before selling it to Plaintiff.

20. Defendant did not complete a computer diagnostic of the Vehicle before selling it to Plaintiff.

21. Defendant represented that the Vehicle was an S3 model to the Plaintiff.

22. Plaintiff reasonably believed the Vehicle would have the engine of an S3 model.

23. Plaintiff’s decision to purchase the Vehicle was influenced by the performance capabilities of an S3 model and the Defendant’s representations that the Audi was an S3 model with all of the components that are germane to an S3 model.

24. Following the purchase of the Vehicle, Plaintiff was informed by Audi of Sarasota on or about May 24, 2023 that the Vehicle had an Audi A3 engine fitted to it instead of the S3 engine.

25. A true and correct copy of the Audi Sarasota Invoice No. AUCS77145 is attached to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit “B.”

26. Plaintiff would not have agreed to purchase the Audi or paid significantly less for it had he known that it had an A3 engine installed.

27. An Audi A3 has inferior performance attributes than an Audi S3.

28. The Audi was purchased for household purposes.CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) to protect the consuming public from deceptive and unfair trade practices. S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski, 976 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D2793b]. As a remedial consumer protection statute, FDUTPA must be liberally construed to effectuate its protective purposes. Davis v. Powertel, Inc., 776 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) [26 Fla. L. Weekly D146a]; Jones v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. 16-14012-CIV, 2016 WL 11503863, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2016). FDUTPA provides a distinct statutory cause of action designed to remedy consumer injuries caused by deceptive or unfair business practices. Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D3148a]; Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1). The statute’s scope extends beyond common-law fraud to encompass deceptive or unfair conduct that traditional fraud doctrines may not reach. PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly S229a]; Guerrero v. Target Corp., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2012). FDUTPA does not require plaintiffs to prove reliance Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 635 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2011) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1925a]; Cabrera v. Haims Motors, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1322-23 (S.D. Fla. 2017).

To establish a FDUTPA violation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages. Fla. Stat. §§ 501.204(1), 501.2075; Rollins, 951 So. 2d at 869. A practice is deceptive if it is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. PNR, Inc., 842 So. 2d at 777. Unlike common-law fraud, FDUTPA does not require proof of scienter or justifiable reliance. Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 635 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2011) [22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C1925a]; Cabrera v. Haims Motors, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1322-23 (S.D. Fla. 2017). The proper inquiry is whether a reasonable consumer would have been misled by the challenged practice. Fitzpatrick, 635 F.3d at 1283.

FDUTPA declares that any “[v]iolation of any rule adopted under this part or by the Federal Trade Commission” constitutes a violation of the statute. Fla. Stat. § 501.203(3)(c). The violation of certain predicate statutes or regulations incorporated by FDUTPA constitutes a per se violation of the Act, eliminating the need to prove that the conduct is independently deceptive or unfair under general FDUTPA standards. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance Orthopaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Parr v. Maesbury Homes, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1268, 2009 WL 5171770, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2009).

I. Count 1 — FDUTPA – Per se violation of Fla. Stat. § 320.27(9)(b)(3)

Florida Statute § 320.27(9)(b)(3) prohibits motor vehicle dealers from engaging in: “Misrepresentation or false, deceptive, or misleading statements with regard to the sale or financing of motor vehicles which any motor vehicle dealer has, or causes to have, advertised, printed, displayed, published, distributed, broadcast, televised, or made in any manner with regard to the sale or financing of motor vehicles.”

A misrepresentation under this provision occurs when a dealer makes a factual statement about a vehicle’s model or configuration that materially differs from the product delivered. Courts have long recognized that the model designation of a vehicle necessarily denotes its corresponding engine and performance specifications. See Kilborn v. Henderson, 65 So. 2d 533, 536 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953) (holding that “the engine is an essential part of an automobile” and a purchaser has the right to rely on a vehicle’s model designation as a representation of its complete configuration, including its powertrain). When the actual vehicle materially departs from that description, a misrepresentation has occurred regardless of whether the misstatement was intentional.

The undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff purchased a vehicle represented and advertised as a 2016 Audi S3 pursuant to the written RPA dated March 9, 2023, for a purchase price of $23,955.00. After the Vehicle developed drivetrain issues, Audi of Sarasota inspected the Vehicle and determined that it was not equipped with a factory S3 engine. Defendant has offered no evidence disputing this conclusion.

The evidence further demonstrates that Defendant affirmatively represented the Vehicle to be an Audi S3 with performance-oriented features, including an authentic S3 engine. Despite these representations, Defendant performed no diagnostic testing or inspections of the Vehicle to substantiate its claims, reflecting deceptive and misleading conduct.

Accordingly, Gulf Coast Auto has committed a per se violation of Fla. Stat. § 320.27(9)(b)(3). Because the statute imposes liability without requiring proof of intent or knowledge; it is sufficient that Defendant’s representations regarding the Vehicle’s configuration were inaccurate or unsubstantiated.

Because violations of § 320.27(9)(b)3 are expressly recognized as unfair or deceptive acts under FDUTPA, Gulf Coast’s conduct constitutes a per se FDUTPA violation. See Fla. Stat. § 501.203(3)(c); Tirtel v. Sunset Auto & Truck, Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 2:18-cv-481-FtM-99MRM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205441, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2018); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance Orthopaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2018); Parr v. Maesbury Homes, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1268-Orl-19GJK, 2009 WL 5171770, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2009).

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to Count 1.

II. Count 2 — FDUTPA – Per se violation of Fla. Stat. § 501.976(3).

Florida Statutes § 320.27(9)(b)(3) prohibits motor vehicle dealers from making “[m]isrepresentation or false, deceptive, or misleading statements with regard to the sale or financing of motor vehicles.” This provision applies to any statement a dealer “has, or causes to have, advertised, printed, displayed, published, distributed, broadcast, televised, or made in any manner with regard to the sale or financing of motor vehicles.” Fla. Stat. § 320.27(9)(b)(3).

A misrepresentation under this statute occurs when a dealer makes a material factual statement about a vehicle that does not correspond to the actual vehicle sold. The model designation of a vehicle is a material representation that encompasses the vehicle’s essential specifications, including its engine and powertrain configuration. A dealer’s representation that a vehicle is a particular model constitutes a representation about the vehicle’s complete factory configuration. See Kilborn v. Henderson, 65 So. 2d 533, 536 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953) (recognizing that “the engine is an essential part of an automobile”). When the delivered vehicle materially departs from the model designation advertised and sold, a statutory misrepresentation has occurred.

The undisputed facts establish that Defendant sold Plaintiff a vehicle advertised, represented, and documented as a 2016 Audi S3 in a written Retail Purchase Agreement dated March 9, 2023, for a purchase price of $23,955.00. Following drivetrain issues, an authorized Audi dealership inspected the vehicle and determined it was not equipped with a factory S3 engine. Defendant has presented no evidence controverting this determination or demonstrating that the vehicle delivered to Plaintiff possessed the genuine S3 powertrain corresponding to the S3 model designation under which it was sold.

The record further demonstrates that Defendant affirmatively represented the vehicle as an Audi S3 with corresponding performance specifications and features. Despite these representations, Defendant performed no diagnostic testing or inspection to verify the vehicle’s actual engine or powertrain configuration prior to sale.

Section 320.27(9)(b)(3) imposes strict liability for misrepresentations in motor vehicle sales. The statute does not require proof of a dealer’s intent, knowledge, or scienter. See Fla. Stat. § 320.27(9)(b)(3); cf. PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly S229a] (noting FDUTPA does not require proof of intent). It is sufficient that the dealer’s representations regarding the vehicle were materially inaccurate. Based on the undisputed evidence, Defendant violated Fla. Stat. § 320.27(9)(b)(3) as a matter of law. The Court finds that the Defendant’s statements were false representations and the sale was done under false pretenses regarding the S3 model status of the vehicle.

Violations of § 320.27(9)(b)(3) constitute per se violations of FDUTPA. Florida Statutes § 501.203(3)(c) expressly declares that violation of any law or rule incorporated within FDUTPA’s scope constitutes a violation of the Act. Fla. Stat. § 501.203(3)(c). Section 320.27(9)(b)(3) falls within FDUTPA’s incorporated provisions. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance Orthopaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Tirtel v. Sunset Auto & Truck, Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 2:18-cv-481, 2018 WL 6444329, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2018); Parr v. Maesbury Homes, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1268, 2009 WL 5171770, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2009). Defendant’s violation of § 320.27(9)(b)(3) therefore constitutes a FDUTPA violation without requiring independent proof that the conduct was deceptive or unfair under general FDUTPA standards.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to Count 2.

III. Count 4 — FDUTPA – Per se violation of Fla. Stat. § 501.976(18)

Florida Statute § 501.976(18) prohibits a dealer from charging a predelivery service fee unless the fee is accompanied by the following disclosure: “This charge represents costs and profit to the dealer for items such as inspecting, cleaning, and adjusting vehicles, and preparing documents related to the sale.”

This requirement is clear and unambiguous, and courts have consistently held that predelivery service fees imposed without the statutory disclosure violate the statute as a matter of law. See Cabrera, 288 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Jonathan Perez v. Rick Case Cars, Inc., 30 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 512a (Fla. Broward Cnty. Ct. Jan. 9, 2022).

The undisputed evidence establishes that Gulf Coast charged Plaintiff a $799 “Document Processing Fee” as part of the Retail Installment Sales Contract for the Audi.

That charge is a predelivery service fee. Defendant, however, failed to include the disclosure mandated by § 501.976(18). Indeed, Defendant admitted that it “did not provide the proper notice on all documents” as required by law. The Court finds that the Defendant made a false representation through omission.

By charging a predelivery service fee without the required disclosure, Defendant violated § 501.976(18). Such a violation constitutes a per se violation of FDUTPA because § 501.976(18) is a statute that proscribes “unfair methods of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices.” Fla. Stat. § 501.203(3)(c); see, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance Orthopaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2018); Parr v. Maesbury Homes, Inc., 2009 WL 5171770, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2009); Meitis v. Park Square Enters., Inc., 2009 WL 703273, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2009).

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to Count 4.

IV. Count 6 — FDUTPA — Per se violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.2935

Florida law imposes clear duties on licensed dealerships with respect to emissions equipment. Section 316.2935(1)(b), Florida Statutes, requires that at the point of sale, a dealer certify in writing to the purchaser that the vehicle’s air pollution control equipment has not been tampered with. The Florida Administrative Code, Rule 62-243.500(1)(d)(2), further mandates that dealers visually inspect and certify the presence of a catalytic converter before a vehicle is sold.

The undisputed record establishes that Defendant violated these duties. On March 9, 2023, Defendant executed a Vehicle Air Pollution Control Statement affirming that it had inspected the Audi and certified the catalytic converter was present. Twelve days later, however, an independent diagnostic inspection revealed that the catalytic converter was not present when the Vehicle was sold to Plaintiff. Defendant admitted that it is unaware whether the Vehicle was inspected before selling it to Plaintiff. It also maintains no written policies or documentation of such inspections, and concedes it lacks even basic knowledge of the catalytic converter’s location, while simultaneously asserting it had no obligation to conduct the inspection, contrary to the plain statutory requirements.

These facts demonstrate that Gulf Coast falsely certified compliance with Florida’s emissions laws, falsely misrepresented the condition of the Audi, and sold the vehicle in violation of mandatory statutory duties. Such conduct constitutes an unfair and deceptive practice actionable under FDUTPA. See Viene v. Concours Auto Sales, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that dealership committed unfair and deceptive act by misrepresenting that a vehicle passed state inspection and falsely claiming possession of the inspection certificate when, in fact, the vehicle had not passed inspection and required repairs).

Because a sale in violation of statutory emissions regulations constitutes a per se violation of FDUTPA under § 501.203(3)(c), and because Gulf Coast has identified no disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on this claim is warranted.

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to Count 6.

V. Count 7 — Breach of Express Warranty

The Court finds genuine issues of material fact remain as to Count 7. Disputed questions exist concerning whether any express warranty was made regarding the vehicle’s configuration, whether such representations extended beyond mere sales talk, and the scope and enforceability of any such warranty. Because these factual disputes must be resolved by the trier of fact, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED as to Count 7.

VI. Count 10 — FCCPA Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)

As to Count 10, there are disputes of material fact on whether Defendant knew, at the time of its communication, that the asserted right to collect the improperly disclosed pre-delivery service fee was nonexistent. The FCCPA requires proof of actual knowledge. See Bentley v. Bank of Am., N.A., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Because the summary judgment record does not establish knowledge as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED as to Count 10.

VII. Damages

FDUTPA relief is cumulative of other remedies. § 501.213(1), Fla. Stat. Actual damages are generally measured by the difference between the market value of the goods as delivered and their market value as represented. Tri-Cnty. Plumbing Servs., Inc. v. Brown, 921 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D227a]; Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Although damages cannot be speculative, they may be based on reasonable estimates supported by competent evidence. United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1988).

Here, Plaintiff’s expert opined that Mr. Persaud sustained $4,050 in diminution-in-value damages, and Gulf Coast Auto offered no contrary expert evidence. Plaintiff also proved that Gulf Coast collected a $799 predelivery/document processing fee without statutory disclosure. Florida courts have held that consumers are entitled to refunds of such improperly disclosed fees. Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., 758 So. 2d 699, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) [25 Fla. L. Weekly D309a]; Bowe v. Pub. Storage, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2015) [25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D197a]; Morgan v. Pub. Storage, 301 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to $4,849 in total FDUTPA damages ($4,050 diminution + $799 illegal fee). Importantly, at the September 25, 2025 hearing, Defendant consented to this damages figure, removing any dispute over the amount. These damages are cumulative under § 501.213(1), Fla. Stat.

VIII. Injunctive Relief — Fla. Stat. § 501.211(1)

Section 501.211(1), Florida Statutes, authorizes “[a]nyone aggrieved” by a FDUTPA violation to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief. Unlike traditional injunction standards, FDUTPA does not require proof of irreparable harm or a showing of likelihood of future injury. Gastaldi v. Sunvest Communities USA, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057-58 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. Timeshares Direct, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1149, 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D2168a]. Courts construe the term “aggrieved” broadly to include anyone who has been treated unfairly or deceptively. Ahearn v. Mayo Clinic, 180 So. 3d 165, 171-72 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) [40 Fla. L. Weekly D2502d].

The undisputed record establishes that Plaintiff is an aggrieved consumer under FDUTPA. Gulf Coast misrepresented the vehicle’s model and performance attributes, charged an illegal predelivery fee without the required statutory disclosure, and certified emissions compliance despite the absence of required equipment. These violations demonstrate a pattern of unfair and deceptive conduct. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to permanent injunctive relief enjoining Gulf Coast from:

(a) advertising or selling vehicles using a model designation without verifying accuracy;

(b) charging predelivery service fees without including the statutory disclosure required by § 501.976(18); and,

(c) certifying emissions compliance under § 316.2935 without conducting and documenting a contemporaneous visual inspection of required components.

IX. Attorneys’ Fees – Fla. Stat. § 501.2105

Pursuant to section 501.2105, Florida Statutes, a prevailing plaintiff under FDUTPA is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Because Plaintiff has prevailed on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 6, the Court finds that he is entitled to an award of fees and costs.

The Court reserves jurisdiction to determine the reasonable amount following proper motion and supporting materials.

Accordingly, it is ADJUDGED and ORDERED:

a) Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DIN 243) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth above.

b) Final summary judgment on liability and damages is ENTERED for Plaintiff and against Gulf Coast Auto Brokers, Inc. on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 6.

c) Plaintiff is ENTITLED to recover his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under § 501.2105, Florida Statutes, and jurisdiction is RESERVED to determine the amount; jurisdiction is RESERVED to liquidate fees and costs and to enforce this Order.

d) Plaintiff is AWARDED actual damages as stated herein

e) Injunctive relief under § 501.211(1) is ENTERED as stated above.

f) A separate judgment incorporating the above shall be entered.

g) Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to Counts 7 and 10.

h) All remaining claims and deadlines not addressed herein remain in effect.