Legal Topics

Mortgages — Foreclosure — Limitation of actions — Five-year statute of limitations to file foreclosure action began to run from date of acceleration letter where mortgage did not contain reinstatement provision or any other similar contractual term that would give mortgagee or mortgagor right to reinstate installment nature of mortgagor’s payment obligation after acceleration occurred — Because foreclosure action was filed outside of five-year limitations period, mortgagor’s motion for summary judgment is granted

Apr 18th, 2026 in by admin

Mortgages — Foreclosure — Limitation of actions — Five-year statute of limitations to file foreclosure action began to run from date of acceleration letter where mortgage did not contain reinstatement provision or any other similar contractual term that would give mortgagee or mortgagor right to reinstate installment nature of mortgagor’s payment obligation after acceleration occurred — Because foreclosure action was filed outside of five-year limitations period, mortgagor’s motion for summary judgment is granted

COUNTRYWIDE CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff, v. MANUEL STIPANISICH, Defendant. Circuit Court, 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County. Case No. CACE22010039. Division 11. November 6, 2025. Carlos Augusto Rodriguez, Judge. Counsel: Adria M. Jensen and Katharine G. Hadded, Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, Sarasota, for Plaintiff. Anthony Gonzalez, Light Gonzalez Law, PLLC, Plantation, for Defendant.FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDERON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FORSUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT’SCROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came before the Court for hearing on October 8, 2025 at 3:00 p.m. on Plaintiff COUNTRYWIDE CAPITAL GROUP, LLC’s (hereinafter, referred to as the “Plaintiff”) April 11, 2025 Amended Motion for Final for Summary Judgment and Defendant, MANUEL STIPANISICH (hereinafter, referred to as the “Defendant”) October 5, 2024 Cross-Motion for Summary Final Judgment, the Court having reviewed the docket, heard argument of counsel, and otherwise being advised on the premises that it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

1. Plaintiff and Defendant’s Motions come before the Court on cross Motions for Summary Judgment.

2. Defendant asserts that this Plaintiff’s cause of action for mortgage foreclosure is barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in §95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. The Court agrees.

3. Importantly, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the terms of the note and mortgage, the acceleration of the debt by written demand, and that Plaintiff accelerated the maturity of the indebtedness and the mortgage via written acceleration letter and demand dated April 29, 2014.

4. A mortgagee can initiate foreclosure proceedings for non-payment of any installment amount as it becomes due. See Hotel Management Co. v. Krick, 158 So. I 18, 119- 20 (Fla. 1934). If the note or mortgage contains an “acceleration clause,” however, the mortgagee can declare default after the nonpayment of an installment and demand payment of the full amount of the note at that time. See LRB Holding Corp. v. Bank of America, N .A., 944 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D2980c]; David v. Sun Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 461 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1984).

5. Once the right to accelerate is exercised, the entire debt becomes due, and the statute of limitations begins to run on that date. “A cause of action for foreclosure accrues on the maturity date of the loan unless the lender elects to accelerate at an earlier date.” U.S. Bank Home Mortg. v. Boivin, 403 So. 3d 421, 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) [50 Fla. L. Weekly D401a] (emphasis added) (citing Bollettieri Resort Villas Condo. Ass’n v. Bank of New York Mellon, 228 So. 3d 72, 74-75 (Fla. 2017) [42 Fla. L. Weekly S847a] (Lawson, J., concurring)); see also Spencer v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 97 So. 3d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) [37 Fla. L. Weekly D2068a] (“[T]he record contains unrebutted affirmative evidence from the plaintiff’s representative that a prior owner of the mortgage had appropriately accelerated it, thus triggering the limitations period under section 95.l1(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2012), well more than five years before the commencement of this action”).

6. A cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, upon the occurrence of the final element necessary to establish a claim. SeeFla. Stat. § 95.031 (“the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. . .[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the action occurs”). A cause of action for foreclosure of a mortgage accrues upon a default and a demand of payment by the mortgagee. See Ruhl v. Perry, 390 So.2d 353, 356 (Fla. 1980) (noting that pursuant to section 95.031, “a cause of action accrues on a written instrument payable on demand. . . when the ‘first written demand for payment occurs’ ”).

7. A debt can only be decelerated when a contract or statute expressly authorizes the deceleration. See Bauwens v. Revcon Tech. Grp., Inc., 935 F.3d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Bartram v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 211 So. 3d 1009, 1013-14 (Fla. 2016) [41 Fla. L. Weekly S493a]). Plaintiff has not identified any provision in a contract between the parties that authorizes deceleration, nor has Plaintiff identified a statute that authorizes deceleration. Additionally, Plaintiff has not identified any evidence in this record that shows that the parties otherwise agreed to deceleration after Plaintiff sent Defendant the April 29, 2014 letter demanding that Defendant pay the entire outstanding balance.

8. As argued by Defendant, the mortgage at issue in Bartram v. U.S. Bank, N.A. contained a reinstatement provision that allowed for the note and mortgage to be reinstated “as if no acceleration had occurred”. 211 So. 3d 1009, 1013-14 (Fla. 2016) [41 Fla. L. Weekly S493a],

9. Here, unlike the mortgage at issue in Bartram, the mortgage Plaintiff seeks to foreclose does not contain a reinstatement provision or any other similar contractual term that gives either Plaintiff or Defendant the right to reinstate the installment nature of the Defendant’s payment obligations as if no acceleration had occurred. Instead, as soon as Plaintiff exercised its optional right to accelerate the maturity date of the note and mortgage, the full balance became due and payable immediately.

10. There could be no “implicit” reinstatement, as argued by Plaintiff, nor did Plaintiff identify any evidence in the court record which would tend to show that the statute of limitations was reset or tolled.

11. After Plaintiff accelerated the maturity date on April 29, 2014, the installment nature of the note and mortgage terminated, and the five years statute of limitation to file an action to foreclose the mortgage began to run. Cf. Maki v. NCP Bayou 2, 368 So. 3d 1081, 1086 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) [48 Fla. L. Weekly D1223a] (holding that where acceleration was never revoked, there could be no “subsequent default” on reinstituted installment payments and therefore the statute of limitations began to on the original acceleration). See also Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 156 So. 3d 538, 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) [40 Fla. L. Weekly D201b] (discussing acceleration clauses and stating that the statute of limitations commences when the lender exercises the acceleration option and notifies the borrower).

12. There could be no “implicit” reinstatement, as argued by Plaintiff, nor did Plaintiff identify any evidence in the court record which would tend to show that the statute of limitations was reset or tolled. In fact, Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at all, and therefore has waived any arguments in opposition might have otherwise had.

13. Plaintiff did not initiate this action until July 8, 2022, and therefore the lawsuit was filed well outside the five-year statute of limitations.

14. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

15. Plaintiff shall take nothing by this action and Defendant shall go hence without day.

16. Final Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

17. The Court reserves jurisdiction to determine entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs.